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Are Statutes Constraining Gubernatorial
Power to Make Temporary Appointments to
the United States Senate Constitutional Under
the Seventeenth Amendment?
by VIKRAM DAVID AMAR"
After Republican Senator Craig Thomas died last June while
undergoing leukemia treatment, Wyoming's Democratic Governor
Dave Freudenthal filled the vacancy by appointing Republican State
Senator John Barrasso.1 Barrasso will serve in the U.S. Senate until
the beginning of 2009. A special election in November 2008 will
decide who will finish Thomas's term through 2013.2
Analysts were not surprised that Senator Thomas's death
generated no short-term effects on the partisan balance of the closely
divided Senate. They noted that although Governor Freudenthal is a
Democrat, Wyoming state law provided that when picking a
temporary replacement to serve until the special election of 2008, the
Governor was required to choose from among three candidates put
up by the leadership of the State Republican Party-the party
represented by the fallen incumbent.
This description of Wyoming law is accurate: Wyoming Elections
Code section 22-18-111(a)(i) indeed directs that, in the event of a Senate
vacancy among the Wyoming Senate contingent, the central party
committee of the party represented by the prior incumbent is to submit
three names of qualified persons to the Governor, who "shall" then
choose one of the three to serve in the Senate until a popular election is
held.3
. Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, UC Berkeley
School of Law.
1. Michael Falcone, Wyoming: Senator Named to Fill Vacancy, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
2007, at A9.
2. Id.
3. The text of the Wyoming statute provides:
[7271
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It is dubious, however, that Wyoming's law-and that of a few other
states whose statutes resemble Wyoming S4 -is valid under the U.S.
Constitution. It is at least very questionable whether a legislature can
force a governor to pick one of the three persons served up by state
party leaders. It is similarly questionable whether a state can require
a governor to fill a Senate vacancy with someone of the same party as
the prior incumbent. (Arizona's statute purports to do this, and raises
a substantial constitutional controversy that could have major
implications should Republican Senator John McCain become
President and be replaced by a Democratic governor.) This Article
pursues these and related questions.The Article proceeds as follows:
Part I provides detailed textual arguments against Wyoming's law and
similar schemes. Part II analyzes the relevant (and somewhat sparse)
United States Supreme Court authority bearing on these issues. Part
III buttresses Part I's textual argument by drawing on the history and
If a vacancy occurs in the office of United States senator or in any state office
other than the office of justice of the supreme court and the office of district
court judge, the governor shall immediately notify in writing the chairman of the
state central committee of the political party which the last incumbent
represented at the time of his election under W.S. 22-6-120(a)(vii), or at the time
of his appointment if not elected to office. The chairman shall call a meeting of
the state central committee to be held not later than fifteen (15) days after he
receives notice of the vacancy. At the meeting the state central committee shall
select and transmit to the governor the names of three (3) persons qualified to fill
the vacancy. Within five (5) days after receiving these three (3) names, the
governor shall fill the vacancy by temporary appointment of one (1) of the three
(3) to hold the office. If the incumbent who has vacated office did not represent a
political party at the time of his election, or at the time of his appointment if not
elected to office, the governor shall notify in writing the chairman of all state
central committees of parties registered with the secretary of state. The state
central committees shall submit to the governor, within fifteen (15) days after
notice of the vacancy, the name of one (1) person qualified to fill the vacancy.
The governor shall also cause to be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the state notice of the vacancy in office. Qualified persons who do
not belong to a party may, within fifteen (15) days after publication of the
vacancy in office, submit a petition signed by one hundred (100) registered
voters, seeking consideration for appointment to the office. Within five (5) days
after receiving the names of qualified persons, the governor shall fill the vacancy
by temporary appointment to the office, from the names submitted or from those
petitioning for appointment.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(1) (2007).
4. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 17-1 (2007) (providing scheme similar to Wyoming which
allows the Governor to fill U.S. Senator vacancies with a temporary appointment from a
list of three prospective appointees submitted by the same political party as the prior
incumbent); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502 (2007) (directing that the Governor "shall"
appoint someone from "one of three persons nominated by the state central committee of
the same political party as the prior officeholder."); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §16-
222 (2007) (requiring the Governor to fill U.S. Senator vacancy with appointee from the
same political party as the person vacating the office). For a discussion of whether a
statute like Arizona's is unconstitutional, see infra Part IV.
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structure of the Seventeenth Amendment. Of particular importance,
Part III points out that only governors-not state legislatures and
certainly not state political parties-are elected by the people of each
state collectively in precisely the way U.S. Senators are. Part IV then
explains why schemes like Arizona's should likely be treated similarly
to Wyoming's. Part V concludes by reminding that the Senate itself
has important, and perhaps ultimate, responsibility to interpret and
preserve the meaning of the Constitution, including the provisions
relating to Senate elections and vacancies.
I. Textual Arguments From the Seventeenth Amendment
A. Section 2 of the Seventeenth Amendment Textually Forbids State
Legislatures From Unduly Constraining Governors' Exercise of
Temporary Senate Appointment Powers
The key provision to consider is Section 2 of the Seventeenth
Amendment. The Seventeenth Amendment was an alteration of the
Constitution, added in 1913, to guarantee direct popular election (as
distinguished from state legislative selection) of U.S. Senators.
Section 2 says:
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in
the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to
make temporary appointments until the people fill the
vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.5
There is a very forceful textual argument that the Seventeenth
Amendment prevents the Wyoming legislature from dictating the
Governor's specific personnel choices in making a temporary Senate
appointment: The Amendment's language differentiates between a
state "legislature" and a state "executive" authority, and does not
authorize a state legislature to make or constrain any temporary
appointments itself, but rather only to "empower the [state] executive
[]to make [the] appointments.... "6
In other words, the Amendment, by its terms, creates potential
appointment power only in governors; it does not authorize
legislatures to participate in such appointment decisions, beyond
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 2.
6. Id.
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simply determining whether governors should be allowed to make
temporary appointments or not.
This textual argument that the legislature has no authority to
limit the governor's substantive choices to specific persons or kinds of
persons is reinforced by the last five words of Section 2 of the
Seventeenth Amendment: "as the legislature may direct."7  This
clause refers to, and confirms, the legislature's discretion as to the
timing and procedures of any special popular election to be held to fill
a vacancy. By contrast, the provisions concerning gubernatorial
temporary appointment lack any similar language suggesting
legislative discretion with respect to the process, let alone the
substance, of such a gubernatorial appointment-which strongly
suggests that the legislature does not have broad prescriptive powers
here. If the drafters and ratifiers of the Amendment had expected
the state legislature to have a significant role in the governor's
execution of his appointment power with respect to temporary Senate
appointments, the Amendment could very easily have included some
phrase like "as the legislature has directed" or "subject to the
legislature's requirements" right after or before the clause referring
to the governor's statutorily created power to make appointments.
Perhaps an analogy will reinforce this kind of "intratextual"
argument.8  In Marbury v. Madison,9 Chief Justice Marshall
confronted the question whether, given the language of Article III,
Congress enjoys power to increase the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court beyond the categories mentioned in the Constitution
itself. As Akhil Amar has observed, "[1]eading scholars have not
been kind to Marshall's exposition [in which Marshall concluded
Congress lacked such power], calling it 'far from obvious,' 'clearly
overstated,' and 'surely wrong."'' °
Akhil goes on to argue, though, that a more careful "intratextual
comparison" of Article III than Marshall performed "would have
enabled him to rebut his modern scholarly critics"" and confirm the
strength of his Article III reading:
7. Id.
8. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999)
(suggesting a holistic interpretive approach to the Constitution).
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 146-49 (1803).
10. Amar, supra note 8, at 764.
11. Id.
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The Appellate Jurisdiction Clause explicitly authorizes
Congress to subtract from the Supreme Court's appellate
docket; but the Original Jurisdiction Clause contains no
comparable language authorizing Congress to add to the
Court's original jurisdiction docket. Just as the Appellate
Jurisdiction Clause confers jurisdiction "with such exceptions as
Congress shall make," so the Original Jurisdiction Clause
should have conferred jurisdiction "with such augmentations
(and exceptions) as Congress shall make" had it been designed
as a minimum (or a default rule) rather than a maximum. The
fact that the Original Jurisdiction Clause does not contain
augmentation wording symmetric to the exception wording of
the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause elegantly buttresses
Marshall's conclusion that Congress has no power to add to the
Court's original docket. The point here is not a standard
textual point about the Original Jurisdiction Clause, but a
[Joseph] Story-like intratextual point that emphasizes the
variation in language between this clause and the next one.
In his thought-provoking Response essay, Professor Levinson
questions my use of intratextualism in the Seventeenth Amendment
by suggesting that "[o]ne might .. argue ... that the final clause [of
Section 2 of the Seventeenth Amendment]-'as the legislature may
direct'-applies to the 'empowerment' clause as well as the 'special
elections' one."' 3 Yet, as prominent legal commentator and treatise
writer Jabez Sutherland explained, around the time versions of what
would become the Seventeenth Amendment were drafted, the
general rule of statutory interpretation during the nineteenth century
was that "[r]elative and qualifying words and phrases, grammatically
and legally, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the
last antecedent. A proviso is construed to apply to the provision or
clause immediately precedent."'" Under this rule of interpretation,
commonly referred to as the "doctrine of the last antecedent,"15 the
"as the legislature may direct" language of the Seventeenth
Amendment is presumed to apply only to the "until the people fill the
vacancies by election" provision directly preceding it. While this
12. Id. at 764-65.
13 Sanford Levinson, Political Party and Senatorial Succession: A Response to
Vikram Amar on How to Best Interpret the Seventeenth Amendment, 35 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. at 713.
14 JABEZ G. SUTHERLAND, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION,
Section 267 at 349-51 (1891).
15 For a helpful discussion of this doctrine, see Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REv. 291, 352-356 (2002).
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presumption may be rebutted, Professor Levinson provides no
reason, grammatical 6 or historical, to reject its straightforward and
natural application here. Legal technicalities aside, Levinson's
suggested reading is simply not persuasive as a matter of ordinary
meaning and interpretive common sense.
A textual comparison with the Appointments and Recess
Appointments Clauses of Article II might also be useful in
interpreting Section 2 of the Seventeenth Amendment. The
Appointments and Recess Appointments Clauses of Article II
provide, in relevant part:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in
the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.
The President shall have the Power to fill up all Vacancies that
may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting
Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session. 7
No one would think that when the President is making a recess
appointment, or when a "Court of Law" is empowered by Congress
to make an appointment, that Congress may designate a short list of
specific persons from whom the appointment must be made or
otherwise constrain the particular personnel choices of the appointing
officer. This is in large part because the "Advice and Consent"
language (or something like it) that appears earlier is conspicuously
16 Professor Levinson is keenly aware of this interpretive presumption. Elsewhere,
he has observed that "[e]vidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all
antecedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact
that it is separated from the antecedent by a comma." Jordan Steiker, Sanford Levinson
and Jack Balkin, Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation
and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237, 245 n.46 (1995). In the
present case, as Professor Levinson seems almost to concede, seeLevinson, supra note 13,
at 721, rules of grammar and punctuation support my reading.
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2-3.
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lacking with respect to recess appointments and Court of Law
appointments.1
8
B. Section 2 of the Seventeenth Amendment is Unlike Other
Constitutional References to State "Legislatures" in That Section 2
Textually Contrasts the Legislature with the Executive, Marking Out
the Roles of Each Body
Do the terms "legislature" and "executive authority" in the
Seventeenth Amendment have to be read so strictly? Might the
Seventeenth Amendment simply delegate to "states" more generally
the power to make temporary Senate appointments until a special
election is held? Does the federal Constitution really contain a
textual preference for one elected state institution over another?
After all, there are other instances in which the federal Constitution
refers to state "legislatures" that courts have not read to exclude
participation of other branches of state government.' 9 Shouldn't these
allocations of intra-state power be left simply to state separation of
powers principles?
It is true that there are other places in the Constitution that make
mention of "legislatures" of the states (e.g., Article I, Sections 3 and
4; Article II, Section 2; Article IV, Sections 3 and 4; and Article V).
2
1
And, as discussed more fully below,21 the Supreme Court has read
some, though not all, of these references to "legislatures" to permit
18. Cf. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1997) (confirming that the
Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the executive and
judicial branches).
19. See infra notes 40-41, and accompanying text. See also Vikram David Amar, The
People Made Me Do It: Can the People of the States Instruct and Coerce Their State
Legislatures in the Article V Constitutional Amendment Process?, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1037 (2000); Richard L. Hasen, When "Legislature" May Mean More than
"Legislature": Initiated Electoral College Reform and the Ghost of Bush v. Gore, 35
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q., 599.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed
of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof.... ) (altered by the
Seventeenth Amendment); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The times, places and manner of
holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the
legislature thereof."); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each state shall appoint, in such
manner as the Legislature thereof may direct...."); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 ("[N]o
new states shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any state ... without the
consent of the legislatures of the states concerned."); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (providing
that the federal government shall protect each state against domestic violence "on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened"); U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring ratification of amendments "by the legislatures
of three fourths of the several states.").
21. See supra Part II.
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involvement by other branches of state government, or by the people
themselves. To the extent that other uses of the constitutional term
"legislature of the states" can, as a textual matter, sometimes be read
generously to confer broad powers on states to structure their own
internal divisions of power as they see fit, such generosity seems
textually foreclosed in Section 2 of the Seventeenth Amendment.
The crucial point here is that Section 2 does not simply mention state
"legislatures" in a way that might be interpreted as casual; its terms
on their face textually differentiate within a single sentence between
"legislature" and "executive," granting the former the explicit power
to empower and the latter the explicit power to appoint.
Indeed, if we were to line up all of the Constitution's references
to state "legislatures" along a spectrum of state institutional
specificity, Section 2 of the Seventeenth Amendment's use of the
terms "legislature" and "executive" presents perhaps the clearest
textual demarcation of particular federal powers conferred on specific
state institutions,22 whereas Article II-at issue in Bush v. Gore,3 and
discussed in Professor Hasen's symposium contribution and my
commentary on it4-presents the murkiest allocation, because thegrammatical subject of Article II's key sentence is the "state" itself.25
C. The Power of State Legislatures to Decline to Authorize Temporary
Senate Appointments Altogether Does Not Subsume the Power to
Limit the Exercise of Appointment Authority
Of course, the Seventeenth Amendment's text does permit state
legislatures to simply not authorize gubernatorial temporary Senate
appointments altogether: the term "may" rather than "shall" is used
to describe the legislative authority to create appointment power. 6
22. Another candidate might be Article IV's so-called "Guarantee Clause," which
provides in relevant part that the federal government shall protect each state against
domestic violence "on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened)." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. It would be hard to argue,
given this text, that a state governor enjoys the unilateral power to apply for federal help
when the state legislature is in, or could be in, session.
23. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
24. See Hasen, supra note 19; Vikram David Amar, Direct Democracy and Article II:
Additional Thoughts on Initiatives and Presidential Elections, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
631.
25. U.S. CONST. art. II ("each State shall appoint electors in a manner specified by the
legislature thereof.")(emphasis added).
26. "May" is distinguished from "shall." Cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("[T]he trial
shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.) (emphasis
[Vol. 35:4
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Presumably, legislatures were given this authority in the event that
the legislatively provided-for special popular election was scheduled
early enough that a temporary gubernatorial appointment would not
be worth the effort and might even create more harm than good. But
the power to decide whether it makes practical sense for the governor
to be able to appoint is not the same as, and does not subsume, the
power to dictate who shall be appointed.
We can see this when we look again at the Appointments Clause
of the federal Constitution, in Article II. As noted above,27 that
clause gives Congress the power to "vest" appointment of inferior
federal officers in the President alone, or in Cabinet members or
Courts of Law. But Congress's power to vest appointment authority
in the President does not give Congress the power to generate a list of
three names from which the President can be forced to choose. As
the Court has noted, "[b]y vesting the President with the exclusive
power to select the... officers of the United States, the
Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the
Executive and Judicial Branches." 28
And it should be noted that Congress enjoys more power in this
regard than state legislatures under the Seventeenth Amendment;
Congress, after all, creates federal offices that are to be filled,
whereas state legislatures do not create the United States Senate or
any other federal institution.' Congress's substantive power to create
offices, which is distinct from its power to authorize the President or
others to appoint persons to the offices, gives Congress at least some
leeway to prescribe qualifications for those who shall hold the offices.
D. Just as "May" Does Not Mean "Shall," "Empower" Does Not
Mean "Require"
There is yet another way in which the Wyoming statute likely
impermissibly constrains the Governor. Not only does the statute
purport to limit the Governor to a party-generated short list, it also
added). See Martin v. Hunter's' Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 330 (1816) (providing that
Constitution's use of the term "shall" must be interpreted as imperative).
27. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
28. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997). See also U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133 (1976).
29. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 837-38 (providing that members of congress, while
elected by separate constituencies, hold "offices that are integral and essential components
of a single National Government."); see also infra notes 94, 100-09 and accompanying text.
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purports to require him to make an appointment within days of
receiving the three names."
This, too, seems problematic, under a careful reading of the text
of Section 2. That provision says state legislatures may "empower"
governors to make temporary appointments, until the people fill the
vacancies by election.31 "Empower" does not mean "require;" rather,
it means to create the power to do or not do something. The
Constitution generally distinguishes between powers and duties, and
the Seventeenth Amendment's words seem to speak only to possible
gubernatorial powers, not any gubernatorial duties.32
Professor Levinson, in his Response essay,33 does not explicitly
discuss the meaning of "empower" in this context, but suggested in
his oral remarks at the symposium that Section 2 perhaps ought to be
read to require governors to make appointments. He reasoned that
this result makes sense in light of the modern need to fill Senate
vacancies quickly, especially, say, in the event of mass openings due
to terrorism. In explaining his interpretive methodology here,
Professor Levinson writes in his Response essay:
I strongly believe that the very first question should be the
following: How would we design the Constitution in 2008 with
regard to filling senatorial vacancies? Only after resolving that
question should we move on to inquiries into text, structure and
history. And, with regard to those interrogations, we should
ask whether the text, structure and history so definitively point
in a direction different from our own answer to the first
question that we must reluctantly conclude that we must
acquiesce .... 34
30. Wyoming is not the only state whose statute by its text attempts to require a
governor to make temporary appointments. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-222
(2007) ("For a vacancy in the office of United States senator, the governor shall appoint a
person to fill the vacancy."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502 (2007) (directing that
Governor "shall" appoint someone from one of three persons nominated by the state
central committee of the same political party as the prior officeholder.).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (emphasis added).
32. For example, the Recess Appointments Clause does not require Presidents to
make recess appointments by giving him the "power" to do so. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
The same can be said for the President's "power" to make treaties and nominate officers
for Senate confirmation. Id. Nor does a President have to exercise the "power" he is
given to grant reprieves and pardons. Id.
33. See Levinson, supra note 13.
34. Levinson, supra note 13 at 716.
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If this "modern policy first" reasoning were sound, then perhaps
we should also read Section 2 as requiring state legislatures to create
gubernatorial appointment power to fill such vacancies promptly.
Yet, as noted below, 35 there are at least four or five states that
currently do not authorize their governors to make temporary Senate
appointments, and under Professor Levinson's approach, their
schemes would seem to be problematic.
In any event, I tend to disagree with Professor Levinson about
the order in which we should consider text, history, structure and
modern drafting preferences; I think starting with modern desires is
very unlikely to generate much interpretive consensus. I also likely
disagree with him on the question of how ambiguous the text, history
and structure needs to be before we read the document's words, as he
would, to mean that which we would write them to say were we
drafting them today in light of our sense of current political and
practical realities.36 Terms like "empower" and "may" seem relatively
clear in this context, and I feel they confine us more than Professor
Levinson suggests.37
II. Arguments from Supreme Court Authority
As Professor Hasen's symposium article 8 (and my essay
responsive to it)39 points out, the Supreme Court has, in some early
Twentieth Century cases, interpreted other provisions in the federal
35. See note 89 infra and accompanying text.
36. To support his methodology, Professor Levinson invokes, of all people, Justice
Antonin Scalia for the proposition that "context is everything, and the context of the
Constitution tells us not to expect nit-picking detail, and to give the words and phrases an
expansive rather than narrow interpretation-though not an interpretation that the
language will not bear." Levinson, supra note 13, at 716. But shortly after observing that
"context is everything," Justice Scalia makes clear that by "context" he is talking about the
context in which the words were originally used, and not the current circumstances in
which they might be applied. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION 38
(1998) ("But the Great Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is not between
Framers' intent and objective meaning, but rather between original meaning (whether
derived from Framers' intent or not) and current meaning."). Justice Scalia is very critical
of interpretive methods that place great reliance on whether a particular reading of a
provision achieves a "desirable result for the case at hand." Id. at 39. Although Justice
Scalia may be more of a consequentialist than he admits, his stated views on interpretive
methodology provide no real support for Professor Levinson in this area.
37. And importantly, as explained more below, see infra notes 63-64 and
accompanying text, I probably have a different sense than Professor Levinson about how
we would write the Seventeenth Amendment even if we were drafting it anew today.
38. Hasen, supra note 19.
39. Amar, supra note 24.
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Constitution that use the phrase "legislature" of the state as not
preventing states from structuring their own internal processes as
they see fit, even when states were invoking those processes to
discharge powers or obligations created by the federal Constitution.
Perhaps most importantly, in Smiley v. Holm,4° the Supreme
Court in 1932 said that the fact that Article I of the Constitution
directs state "legislatures" to draw congressional district lines, subject
to Congressional override, does not prevent a state from involving the
state governor-through his veto power-in the state lawmaking
process used to draw federal district boundaries. If Article I's
reference to "legislatures" did not foreclose gubernatorial
involvement in Smiley, then arguably the Seventeenth Amendment's
reference to state "executive" ought not to foreclose state legislative
involvement in temporary Senate appointments.4'
On the other hand, there are cases like Hawke v. Smith,42 Bush v.
Gore, 3 and most recently Colorado v. Salazar,4 in which particular
Justices (and sometimes the Court) have read references to state
institutions more literally. In Bush v. Gore, a majority of Justices
seemed to embrace precisely the kind of tight reading of the word
"legislature" that would render Wyoming's law problematic.
45
In particular, the Bush v. Gore concurring opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas (an opinion that
likely had the tacit support of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, as
well) 46 concluded that when the federal Constitution, in Article II,
enlists state "legislatures" to determine the method of selecting
members of the so-called presidential electoral college, the
Constitution necessarily forbids states from involving state courts in a
40. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
41. See also Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural
Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1347, 1354-55 (1996)
(explaining the pre-Seventeenth Amendment Oregon Plan and other (seemingly
permitted) examples of states not hewing to narrow definitions of "legislature" in deciding
how states should discharge federal electoral processes). For a more general discussion of
the variation in Supreme Court and historical attitude, see Amar, supra note 24.
42. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
43. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
44. Colorado v. Salazar, 541 U.S. 1093 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, J.,
and Thomas, J., dissenting from the Court's denial of certiorari).
45. While the relevant Bush v. Gore concurrence had only three Justices, its logic was
likely supported by two others as well. See Vikram David Amar and Alan Brownstein,
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way that interferes with the state legislature's wishes. That kind of
interference, these Justices thought, was precisely the federal
constitutional violation happening in Florida in late 2000: Florida
courts were trammeling the unfettered discretion the federal
Constitution gave to the state legislature, by use of the word
"legislature" in Article IlI.
If Article II's specific reference to state "legislatures" insulates
those legislatures from judicial oversight that otherwise would be
provided for under state law, then the Seventeenth Amendment's
reference to "executive" would seem to insulate governors from state
legislative constraint, once the legislature has empowered the
governor to make a temporary appointment in the first place.
What are we to make of this (seemingly uneven) body of
Supreme Court case law? A few points seem in order. First, the
Court has seemed to be more willing to allow flexible interpretation
of a state "legislature's" powers and duties when the issue presented
concerns popular input or control of the legislature rather than inter-
branch encroachment.47 For example, in Bush v. Gore, the concurring
Justices objected to state judicial involvement in the Florida election
process, and the same three Justices in Salazar dissented from the
Court's denial of certiorari indicating their discomfort with state
judicial involvement in Congressional district line drawing. Notably,
their dissent from the denial of certiorari in Salazar intimated that
popular, as opposed to judicial, involvement would be less
constitutionally troubling."
47. It is true, of course, that the Constitution does sometimes seem to distinguish,
textually, between the people of a state and a legislature of a state. Compare, for example,
Article I, Section 3's conferral of Senate selection power on the "legislature" before the
Seventeenth Amendment with Article I, Section 2's use of the term "people thereof" in
providing for U.S. House elections. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 & 3. Such a textual contrast
might raise an inference that legislatures in those contexts should be understood as distinct
from the people who elected them, in the same way that when the term "legislature" is
used next to the term "executive," the Constitution intends to allocate power exclusively
between the two institutions. Yet it bears noting that state peoples create state
legislatures in a way that state legislatures do not create state executives or vice versa, so
there is a structural basis for not reading the textual distinction between people and
legislature as strongly as that between executive and legislature. See Amar, supra note 19.
48. The dissenters from the denial of certiorari observed that "[c]onspicuously absent
from Colorado's lawmaking regime, under the Supreme Court of Colorado's construction
of the Colorado Constitution to include state-court orders as part of the lawmaking, is
participation in the process by a body representing the people, or the people themselves in
a referendum." Salazar, 541 U.S. at 1095 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, J., and
Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Hasen, supra note 19, at 620.
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Second, where the Court has permitted state deviation from the
literal terms of the Constitution, it has done so in contexts where the
Constitution mentioned state legislatures but did not in the same
breath (or sentence) mention (and divide power with) state courts
41and/or governors.
Third, the most prominent case in which the Court allowed
involvement of one branch (the governor) in a way that might
arguably have encroached on textual powers of another (the
legislature) was Smiley.50 But the Court in Smiley was careful to rest
its decision on the ground that district line-drawing, at issue there, is
done ordinarily through a generic legislative process that includes
gubernatorial presentment. As Rick Hasen has explained, the theory
can be described as resting on a "legislature as lawmaking process"
interpretation rather than a "legislature as distinct body of
legislators" reading of the constitutional text.
Even if (as seems possible) this functional reading of the
Constitution's reference to state institutions makes sense,51 it offers
little support to the Wyoming statutory implementation of the
Seventeenth Amendment. Appointment processes, at least those
called for in the federal Constitution, 2 ordinarily do not involve
significant substantive legislative constraints on personnel choices.53
So even though Smiley's result may suggest flexibility rather than
rigidity in federal constitutional interpretation, the decision's
reasoning actually may cut the other way in the case of Section 2 of
the Seventeenth Amendment and gubernatorial appointment power.54
49. See supra notes 20-22, and accompanying text.
50. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932) (holding that the U.S. Constitution's silence
with regard to a state governor's role in the legislative process leaves governor's
participation as "a matter of state polity").
51. See Amar, supra note 19.
52. I think the federal processes are most relevant since states are discharging a
federal function. State constitutional processes might sometimes involve legislative
appointments, but even these would be the exception, not the rule.
53. See, e.g., supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
54. Of course, Smiley may be good support for the idea that governors can participate
(via presentment and the veto) in the enactment of laws that "empower" them to make
temporary Senate appointments and the laws that provide for special elections, because
laws that create appointment power and laws that regulate elections (both at the federal
and state levels) ordinarily are made through generic lawmaking procedures that feature
presentment.
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I. Historical and Structural Reasons to Reject Wyoming's
Vacancy-Filling Statute
A. The History of Direct Election and the Seventeenth Amendment
Reflects a Distrust of Political Parties, Especially of Party Bosses
In addition to the textual analysis provided above, there are
compelling historical and structural reasons for thinking the Wyoming
statute and similar constraints on governors run afoul of the
Seventeenth Amendment.
If the history of the Seventeenth Amendment reveals anything, it
is the distrust and skepticism Progressives had concerning the
influence of political parties. This distrust and skepticism was
reflected in a number of specific concerns. First, those who pushed
for direct election of U.S. Senators often blamed partisan excess and
party machinations for the legislative deadlocks in filling Senate
vacancies.5 In state legislatures that were closely divided between the
two parties, the reform proponents both invoked and criticized dirty
tricks and sharp parliamentary practices. 6 In Colorado in 1903, for
example, in an episode cited by Seventeenth Amendment
proponents, each party accused the other of fraudulent behavior and
tried to enlist the coercive arm of the state to punish the other: "The
Democrats had at their back the police of Denver, while the
Republicans appealed to the Governor for troops, and for a time
chaos and bloodshed seemed inevitable."57  In another notable
instance, in Kentucky in 1896, "threats and assaults [between party
leaders in the legislature] became so frequent that the Governor felt
forced to call out the militia, and for three days the legislature met in
a capital filled with troops enforcing martial law."58
The discontent with partisan zeal and excess was not limited to
inter-party dust-ups; critics of legislative election also complained
55. See, e.g., Laura E. Little, An Excursion into the Uncharted Waters of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 629, 641 (1991); Roger G. Brooks, Comment,
Garcia, The Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role of the Supreme Court in Defending
Federalism, 10 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 189,200 (1987).
56. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 60-518, at 18 (1908) ("[The] equilibrium of parties in the
State legislatures.., is an increasing mischief."), cited in Little, supra note 55, at 641 n.67;
S. REP. NO. 60-518, at 26 ("[T]he conditions of political parties becomes sometimes so
evenly balanced as that a very small number ... is able to determine the choice of Senator,
or to prevent one being made."), cited in Little, supra note 55, at 641 n.68.
57. GEORGE HENRY HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY
AND PRACTICE 93 (1938).
58. Id. at 91.
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about the dysfunction and inefficiency of party caucuses that stalled
U.S. Senate selection processes even when one party held a firm
majority in the legislature. The "stubbornness" and "acrimony" of
Senate selection before 1913 was due in part to "the extent to which
the whole situation was often being dominated by party caucus, a
body unknown to the law, meeting behind closed doors.... ""
This vision of party secrecy and backroom party deals cut by a
few persons who could not be counted on to represent the public's
interest was often described in terms of party machines or party
"bosses." As towering Senate historian George Haynes put it,
"[s]ometimes the [S]enatorship was meekly handed over [by the
legislature] to a state boss, whose phenomenal skill in the
manipulation of legislators was out of all proportion to his hold upon
the voters." 6  In one prominent example, Haynes described a
situation in 1897 New York in which the single name of Joseph
Choate-a qualified and eminent man-was initially submitted to the
majority party caucus; but when the vote was held, all but 7 of the 151
members of the majority party voted in favor of someone else-party
boss Thomas Platt. One observer believed Platt's "control of the
legislature [to be] more complete than his control of any office boy in
his employ; for the office boy, after all, is not owned by Mr. Platt, and
could quit work if he did not find that the place suited him, but the
legislature seems to be his, both soul and body.,
61
In 1911, Indiana Senator Beveridge speaking on behalf of one of
the many constitutional proposals of what became the Seventeenth
Amendment, had this assessment of party influence and distortion:
Political parties.., elect a legislature, and [the] majority in that
legislature is not supposed, nor even permitted, according to the
original theory of the Constitution, to select the best man in the
State .... It must select a man of the party which elected the
legislature .... So it comes to pass that Senators actually have
been... selected by the "party managers".... The party boss
has become more potent than the legislature, or even the
people themselves, in selecting United States Senators in more
than one State.62
59. Id.
60. Id. at 93.
61. See id. at 93 n.3.
62. 46 CONG. REc. 2253 (1911) (statement of Senator Beveridge).
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The part of Wyoming law that delegates to Party chiefs the task
of generating a short list seems to run quite counter to the historical
anti-boss spirit of the direct election drive.
Professor Levinson sees virtues in a modern world where
political parties are enduring and sometimes beneficial realities, to
empowering party leadership to make replacement decisions, because
such schemes may preserve important partisan balances and because
party leaders can ensure that whoever fills a vacancy is a bona fide
party member rather than a nominal one.63 Yet party leaders are also
often much more extreme and partisan than the median party
member in a state, and certainly more extreme and partisan than the
median state voter. Party leaders of one party in a state are thus poor
surrogates for the voting public. Even if I were to agree with
Professor Levinson that we could read the Seventeenth Amendment
largely to reflect our modern drafting preferences, my own modern
preferences would still disfavor empowering party heads. Indeed, at a
minimum, a scheme in which a governor isn't constrained by party
leaders but rather only bound to pick a member of the same party as
the fallen incumbent (or perhaps better yet pick someone the fallen
incumbent himself designated as a successor) would be a less
problematic (though still to my mind problematic) means of
preserving party continuity even if such continuity were strongly
desired as a matter of modern policy.' Thus, even under Professor
Levinson's interpretive methodology, the Wyoming scheme (and the
others like it) remains to me quite problematic.
Professor Levinson also says that governors today are essentially
party bosses whether we call them that or not:
State governors, with rare exceptions, are important members
of their state party's hierarchy. If one doubts their designation
as 'party bosses,' it may be only because in the modern era it is
hard to designate anyone as a 'party boss' in the sense that term
was used in the Progressive era....
What Professor Levinson misses, however, is that governors
(unlike Party central committees) are elected-by the very people of
the state in whom the Seventeenth Amendment vests ultimate power
63. Levinson, supra note 13 at 722.
64. For a discussion of these alternatives and their unconstitutionality under our
current Seventeenth Amendment, see infra Part IV.
65. Levinson, supra note 13 at 722 (emphasis in original).
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to select U.S. Senators. And, as elaborated below,6 governors-like
U.S. Senators but unlike state legislatures-are elected in statewide
contests that cannot be skewed by various kinds of common
gerrymandering. Thus, there was, and is still today, a good reason for
the Seventeenth Amendment's textual preference for governors over
state party officials and state legislators; governors can lay claim to
represent the people of a state better than do unelected party officials
or even elected, but malapportioned, legislatures in this context
because governors are elected the exact same way that the
Seventeenth Amendment requires Senators to be picked.67 In short,
my proffered reading of the Seventeenth Amendment's text seeks to
harmonize its provisions regarding temporary vacancy (the
exceptional circumstance) with its provisions concerning regular
popular elections every six years (the ordinary rule).
B. The History of Direct Election and the Seventeenth Amendment
Reflects a Distrust of Unrepresentative Legislatures
What if the short list had come from the Wyoming legislature
itself rather than the discredited party apparatus? The disdain
reformers had for party machines and party bosses certainly spilled
over to concern about the institutions of state legislatures themselves.
Indeed, Section 1 of the Seventeenth Amendment-its heart and
soul-is most easily understood as an injunction to get state
legislatures out of the business of deciding who shall serve in the
Senate.68 At first blush, the essence of Section 1 ought to inform our
interpretation of how far state legislative powers ought to extend in
Section 2.
The attack reformers made on state legislatures was multi-
pronged. For starters, supporters of the Seventeenth Amendment
accused legislatures of the same kind of corruption that permeated
the political party structure. As one modern commentator has put it,
"[c]orruption, of both state legislators and senators, was the greatest
66. See infra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
67. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Constitution does not empower governors to fill
House vacancies, perhaps because House members are generally elected by different
(local) constituencies from the one that elects both Senators and the governor.
68. Some proposals would have given states the choice to keep legislative selection if
they had wanted. See ALLEN BUSHNELL, ELECTION OF UNITED STATES SENATORS:
VIEWS OF THE MINORITY, H.R. REP. NO. 52-368, at 1-2 (1892) [hereinafter MINORITY
REPORT]. Rejection of this option revealed the high level of distrust of state legislatures
altogether.
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evil blamed on the system of indirect election."69 Whether that widely
held perception of corruption was justified is a more complicated
matter. Haynes summarizes,
[h]ow often resort has been had to bribery and corruption [in
state legislatures] in connection with senatorial elections it is
impossible to determine, but there is indisputable evidence
that a number of legislatures were thus tainted in the interest
of certain candidates, and that this tendency was not lessened
but greatly increased after-if not because of-the enactment
of the [federal] law of 1866 [that attempted to reduce the
incidence of state legislative gridlock] ... The only point to
be noted here is that the increase of the evil [of legislative
corruption] was one of the causes of the unrest and the
popular belief, however unsubstantial may have been its
foundation, that legislative election was at the root of this
noxious growth.0
One might argue that the undeniable concern over state
legislative corruption shared by Seventeenth Amendment advocates
would be a strong reason to read state legislative powers under
Section 2 narrowly, and protect gubernatorial independence and
discretion from legislative overreaching. I think ultimately such a
pro-governor, anti-legislature reading is amply warranted, but I would
caution not to overstress the rhetoric about legislative corruption in
reaching this result. This is not because the rhetoric was overheated
(after all, it did inform the perceptions of those who brought us the
Seventeenth Amendment), but rather because when Seventeenth
Amendment reformers discussed legislative dishonesty, they did not
seem to compare the legislature to the purer, more trustworthy state
"executive authority." That state legislatures were a natural target
for charges of bribery and the like seems somewhat driven by the fact
that legislatures-and not governors-were the ones picking Senators
before the direct election movement succeeded."
69. Brooks, supra note 55, at 200.
70. HAYNES, supra note 57, at 91. See also Little, supra note 55, at 640-41 (quoting
Senator Bradley: "[The original Constitution] was so framed ... by its mechanism-as to
permit corruption and successful rascality.").
71. I do note, however, in this respect, that at the federal level, one reason to prefer
presidential autonomy in making appointments is the belief that the President is more
immune than the legislature to certain kinds of corruption. See Edmond v. United States,
520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997) ("This disposition [giving appointments to the President] was...
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Perhaps the strongest historical/structural argument that
buttresses the already-strong textual case against substantive
legislative involvement and enhanced gubernatorial independence
derives from the concerns Seventeenth-Amendment framers had
about the way state legislatures did not represent the people of a
state, and particular constituencies within the state, because of
malapportionment.
Although largely unnoticed in most modern discussions of direct
Senate election, recognition of the "antiquated systems of
representation" used to draw state legislative districts, and the
resulting unfairness to and misrepresentation of the state peoples was
clear if not always trumpeted. 2 Such malapportioned systems, rife
during the period leading up to the Seventeenth Amendment,
"caused the legislatures' election of Senators to give far different
results from those which would have been yielded by popular
elections. ,
73
Haynes describes one instance in which Democrats held the
governorship for thirteen years during the period between 1865 and
1905, and thus presumably had a working majority of the state's
electorate during those years; and in four presidential elections
Democratic candidates won the state, "but in all that period they
elected but one Senator, and he was sent to Washington for but three
years to fill a vacancy.,
74
As one legislative Report advocating the elimination of state
legislative elections for Senators in 1892 put the point:
Under the present mode of election of Senators, the legislatures
may be induced to make an unfair apportionment, and lay off
unequal and unfair districts in order that the party temporarily
in control in the legislature may reap the reward of the election
designed to assure a higher quality of appointments: The Framers anticipated that the
President would be less vulnerable to interest-group pressure and personal favoritism than
would a collective body."). See also, THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 369 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003) ("The sole and undivided responsibility of one man
will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more exact regard to reputation."); 3
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 374-75
(Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1991) (1833).
72. HAYNES, supra note 57, at 92.
73. Id.
74. Id. See also Brooks, supra note 55, at 200 ("Proponents of direct election also
argued that federal politics provided too strong a motive for state gerrymandering.");
Little, supra note 55, at 640 (decrying the "inadequate representation" that resulted from
indirect election).
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of one of its partisans to the Senate and defeat the popular
choice of the majority party in the State. 5
Even those Congresspersons who filed a Minority Report on the
question agreed about the problem of political gerrymandering:
[It would be good to] do away with the legislative
gerrymandering of the States to secure the election of United
States Senators by the party happening to be in power when
each new apportionment is made. That this has long been the
common practice, no fair-minded, intelligent man will deny.
That it will continue, until the temptation to it is removed, or
our fundamental law otherwise changed, is to be reasonably
expected. The law of retaliation, to some extent, will always be
applied.76
Because they are elected statewide, governors are not plagued by
these problems, either a hundred years ago, or today. Governors
were, and are, better surrogates for the people in this regard than are
state legislatures. The Seventeenth Amendment generally requires
Senators to be picked the exact same way that governors are picked-
through statewide elections with simple majority or plurality rule.
Of course, certain kinds of gerrymandering are no longer
possible in light of the one-person, one-vote cases.77 But concerns
about partisan gerrymandering are not eliminated by the one-person,
one-vote principle. The recent Vieth v. Jubelirer78 case from
Pennsylvania, and the recent experience in Texas,79 also illustrate that.
C. The Gerrymandering Concern Was Especially Powerful Relative to
the Issues of Rural/Urban and Black/White Relations
Partisan gerrymandering at the state level wasn't the only kind of
"misrepresentation" observers of the Seventeenth Amendment
attributed to the legislative selection of Senators. There was an
unmistakable recognition by all participants in the Seventeenth
Amendment debates that legislative election affected the interests of
urban Americans and Blacks. Detractors of the Seventeenth
75. H.R. REP. No. 52-368, at 3 (1892).
76. Id.; MINORITY REPORT at 2.
77. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,
18 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
78. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
79. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
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Amendment expressed worry that eliminating state legislative
involvement would shift power to urban centers.
A speech by Albert Doub made at a 1909 Maryland Bar
Association meeting and incorporated into a Senate Document two
years later, albeit made by someone whose arguments lost in the
ultimate enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment, highlights the
common knowledge about geographical gerrymandering that is part
of the backdrop of the debate over the Amendment:
It has been the settled policy of all the States to create divisions
or districts, and to elect representatives of both houses of the
legislature from these divisions, and not by voting en masse ....
Mass voting for the members of the State legislatures would be
subversive of the principles that have prevailed for more than a
century, and soon would destroy self-government and menace
the liberty of the Republic, and yet that is the very suggestion of
the men who want to improve in this way upon the wisdom of
their ancestors, whose genius designed the fabric of the
Constitution... To give the power of choosing Senators to the
centers of population of the State, the great cities, which are
constantly becoming both relatively and absolutely more
populous, whose interests so often clash with those of other
Sections of the States, and thereby ignore the rights of the
minority, is a new and radical departure from the Constitution,
which may soon undermine its very existence. 8°
Another skeptic of direct election, Senator George Hoar, also
played on geographic and class fears in defending continuing
legislative involvement:
This proposed amendment requires the voice of the State to be
uttered by masses of its citizens, and removes political power to
the great masses who are collected in our cities. Chicago is to
cast the vote of Illinois, Baltimore of Maryland, New York City
of the State of New York, and Cincinnati of Ohio. The farmer
class, which now have their just weight, will be outweighed by
the dwellers of the great towns where the two extremes meet-
great wealth and great poverty-and combine to take
81possession of the affairs of the Government.
80. ALBERT A. DOUB, ELECTION OF UNITED STATES SENATORS, S. Doc. No. 61-
782, at 7 (3d Sess. 1911).
81. PAPERS RELATING TO THE ELECTION OF SENATORS BY DIRET VOTE OF THE
PEOPLE, S. Doc. NO. 59-232, at 22 (1906) (reprinting speech of Senator Hoar delivered to
the U.S. Senate on April 6-7, 1893). See also id. at 62-63 (reprinting a speech of Senator
Edmunds ("[Tihe people of the several political subdivisions of the State should have the
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In some ways, these opponents of the Seventeenth Amendment
preview many of the arguments made by critics of one-person, one-
vote cases fifty years later. In effect, the supporters of the
Seventeenth Amendment rejected their arguments a half-century
before the Warren Court did. But all of that only underscores the
danger inherent in involvement in Senate selection by
malapportioned state legislatures that Seventeenth Amendment
backers perceived.
Nor were the ever-present issues of race, which were and are
intimately connected with issues of class and geography as would be
made clear over the course of the coming decades, lurking far
beneath the surface. Of particular note is an attempt to derail the
Seventeenth Amendment made by Southerners by adding to it a
provision that would repeal Congress' power under Article I, Section
4 to override and displace state legislative choices about the "times,
places and manner" of federal legislative elections. The debate over
this proposed amendment was "frankly partisan and Sectional.""n
Lame-duck New York Senator Chauncey Depew spoke against
the proposed addition on the floor of the Senate in 1911, arguing that
honesty compels the recognition that Blacks were not treated justly
under the current system and that federal oversight power was
necessary to preserve any possibility of equality for African American
voters.83 Although other Senators accused him of maligning the
South and using race and blacks as a "political football,"' Northern
Senators successfully fended off the proposal by invoking the voting
interests of Blacks.
This effort by Southerners to derail the Seventeenth Amendment
by linking direct election to the elimination of federal control over
elections of federal legislators, and the successful move by Northern
Senators to rebuff this effort, highlights the extent to which concerns
of race, class, and rural-urban schisms were on the minds of
Seventeenth Amendment players. Since everyone in the debate
seemed to appreciate that gerrymandered legislatures represented
urban persons and persons of color less fairly than did governors
right to express their choice separately through their legal representatives, as they do in
making laws, and not be overwhelmed by a mere weight of numbers that might occupy
only a corner of the State ....").
82. HAYNES, supra note 57, at 113.
83. See 61 CONG. REc. 1335-39 (1911).
84. 61 CONG. REc. 2657 (1911) (statement of Senator Borah).
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elected in at-large statewide contests, these concerns cut in favor of
readings of the Amendment that promote gubernatorial power and
minimize legislative power.
Another way of putting the argument is to say that the same
Seventeenth Amendment framers who didn't trust state legislatures
to fairly administer federal elections enough to relinquish Article I,
Section 4 oversight powers would not, it seems, trust them to pick
interim Senators (or even short lists) pending a special election.85 In
this regard, it is worth remembering that a temporary appointee can
run as a quasi-incumbent in the special election, which might not be
held in many states for a year or more after the temporary
appointment is made.
Whether our concern about partisan unfairness, geography, and
race in the gerrymandering context is grounded in historical or
originalist arguments about what the framers of the Seventeenth
Amendment had on their minds," or on structural arguments about
adopting a reading of the Constitution that promotes democratic and
egalitarian values," a reading of Section 2 that limits legislative power
and promotes gubernatorial power seems sound. After all, as
Haynes' invocation of Connecticut's late nineteenth century
experience is meant to suggest, statewide elections for executive
offices are much less susceptible to gerrymandering manipulation and
to certain rounding errors inherent in districting (on account of things
like the discrepancy between voter registration and voter turnout,
among others), and for that reason governors are better surrogates
than state legislatures to pick temporary replacements for the Senate
until a special popular election.
85. Indeed, if Congress were wary of state legislatures, giving up Article I, Section 4
power seems less alarming than allowing state legislatures to devise short lists, since the
former deals only with time, place and manner rules-not substantive personnel
selections.
86. Cf Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (concerning House elections and
the originalist meaning of the "people" in Article I).
87. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, in
THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE & THE SUPREME COURT 103 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A.
Epstein eds., The University of Chicago Press 2001).
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D. The Interest in Promptly Filling Senate Vacancies (Which Is Even
More Pressing Today) Argues Against Allowing a Legislature to
Constrain the Governor's Choices
The framers of the Seventeenth Amendment wanted to reduce
stalemates and other glitches that resulted in long-term Senate
vacancies. Indeed, persistent vacancies that injured both the
underrepresented states and the Senate's ability to easily transact
business were among the most persistent complaints concerning the
broken state legislative selection process replaced by the Seventeenth
Amendment. Thus, facilitating prompt Senate replacements was one
of the principal objectives of reform. Haynes summarized the
concern:
[T]hat the placing of the election of senators in the hands of the
legislatures does not serve to thwart the intent of the framers of
the Constitution [to keep the Senate filled], and to multiply
vacancies with their attendant perils, can hardly be denied.
During the past fifteen years [from 1890-1906], in fourteen
contests in ten different States, the body charged with the duty
of electing senators proved powerless to perform its office; four
States have undergone the cost and inconvenience of a special
session of the legislature for the sole purpose of filling vacancies
thus caused; six States accepted vacancies, and thus, by this
antique election process, were effectually deprived of their
equal suffrage in the Senate. 88
It is true, of course, that state legislatures ordinarily would not
want their states to be underrepresented in the Senate for long, which
is why after the Seventeenth Amendment, almost every state has
empowered its governor, on some terms or another, to make
temporary appointments even before replacement elections can be
promptly held.89
88. GEORGE H. HAYNES, AMERICAN PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE ELECTION OF
SENATORS 159 (Ralph C. Ringwalt, ed., 1906); see also Ralph A. Rossum, California and
the Seventeenth Amendment, 6 NEXUS 101, 110-11 (2001) (providing a detailed history of
legislative deadlocks in senator selection); cf. Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk
of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for Current
Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 199-200 (1997) (arguing that while forty-six
deadlocks occurred in twenty states between 1891-1905, the volume of complaints and
problems associated with deadlocks was largely exaggerated).
89. Oklahoma, Massachusetts, Oregon and Wisconsin currently have no statutes
empowering their governors to make temporary Senate appointments, and their statutes
instead suggest that an election is the only way to fill a Senate vacancy. OKLA. STAT. tit.
26, § 12-101 (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 54, § 140 (2007); OR. REV. STAT., § 188.120
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But since governors under the terms of the Seventeenth
Amendment can't be forced, rather only empowered, to fill vacancies
by temporary appointment," a reading of the Amendment that
guarantees gubernatorial discretion in personnel choice is the one
most likely to result in the prompt filling of vacancies. By contrast, a
reading that allows state legislatures to constrain governors (perhaps
to the point that governors might not exercise the powers given if
they don't like the constraints) could increase the likelihood that
vacancies go unfilled during the period before the election is held.
This is especially true given that only some states try to limit their
governors. Such an absence of uniformity increases the chances of
stalemates caused by partisan wrangling.
More generally, a reading of the Seventeenth Amendment that
gives either legislatures or governors the dominant role in making
temporary appointments is more likely to reduce prolonged vacancies
than a reading that requires the two branches to work together and
negotiate with each other over specific candidates.91 And yet the
legislature cannot, as a textual matter, actually make, nor mandate
the making of, the temporary appointments. Thus, allowing broad
legislative involvement can produce stalemates.
Of course, a legislature can statutorily decide to bypass the
governor altogether and provide for a prompt special election, but
this route is expensive and unusual. Moreover, even a prompt
election is not nearly as quick as an executive appointment can be,
which is one reason why few states would eschew temporary
appointments. And as Stanford Levinson has pointed out, the need
for prompt replacement mechanisms is greater now that the modern
world is haunted by the specter of political and economic terrorism
on a potentially grand scale. 92 Should a large number of Senators be
killed in a terror attack, the need for promptly filling Senate vacancies
is particularly acute. But it is precisely at these times that wrangling
(2005); WIS. STAT. §§ 850(4)(b), 17.18. Alaska does have a statute authorizing
gubernatorial temporary appointments, ALASKA STAT. § 15.40.145 (2008), but a 2004
initiative passed by the voters calls into question the validity of that statute. See Revisor's
Note to § 1540.145.
90. See supra notes 30-37, and accompanying text.
91. Cf. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997) (appointments clause
option of vesting appointment in the President alone or Heads of Departments facilitates
prompt appointments).
92. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 70
(Oxford University Press) (2006).
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between governors and legislatures (or their delegates) over
personnel choices could be most costly. Reading Section 2 of the
Seventeenth Amendment so as to minimize the possibility of such
time-consuming intrastate clashes promotes the structural and
historical goal of prompt replacement.
IV. Legislative Specification of Party Continuity
Let us move from the case against allowing party heads or state
legislatures themselves to pick interim U.S. Senators, or even limit
the governor to their short lists, to the related question of whether a
state legislature should be free to specify, as at least one (Arizona's)
has,93 that the governor's pick to fill a temporary vacancy be drawn
from the same political party as the departed Senator.
Even if legislatures cannot be trusted to pick actual candidates,
wouldn't a legislative requirement that the replacement Senator be
drawn from the same party as the departed one simply attempt to
maintain the wishes of the voters from the last Senate election until
the voters can speak directly again, and wouldn't that legislative
instinct be legitimate?94
While these questions may seem closer than those plaguing
Wyoming's approach, the Arizona plan also directly implicates the
Seventeenth Amendment's general distrust of state legislative
motivation and ability to represent statewide voters, and violates the
Amendment's bright-line allocation to governors (and corresponding
exclusion of legislatures) of substantive decision-making power
regarding temporary Senate appointments. To begin with, note that a
state legislature certainly couldn't constrain the state electorate at the
93. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §16-222 (2007) (requiring the Governor to fill U.S.
Senator vacancy with appointee "from same political party as person vacating the
office.").
94. Several federal statutes seem to require the President to take party status into
account in filling congressionally-created posts. See Federal Elections Committee Act, 2
U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (2004) and Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)
(discussed in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113 (1976) and Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 368 (1989) respectively). I am not aware of any challenges to these provisions in
particular; although the statutes, of which they are a part, have sometimes been
challenged. In any event, the federal statutory situation is different, because Congress is
not barred from creating qualifications for federal offices it creates. Still, there ought to
be some discomfort about the practice. Could Congress apply it to federal judges, e.g., by
requiring Presidents to pick an equal number of Democratic and Republican judges or
Justices? Also, this presents First Amendment questions regarding the rights of potential
appointees who may not be members of one of the two major parties; those questions are
beyond the scope of this essay.
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special election to pick only a person from the party of the departed
senator. State law could not, for example, require that only persons
from the same party as the departed Senator have their names placed
on the special election ballot. The reason for this seems intuitive: any
legislative interest in maintaining or predicting the wishes of the
electorate vanishes when the electorate has a chance to express its
wishes itself.
Even if state law constrains only gubernatorial interim
appointments, and not the state electorate at special elections, there
are difficult (indeed seemingly insurmountable) constitutional hurdles
standing in the way of state legislative action. One problem arises
from the possibility of partisan gamesmanship; although the potential
for result-oriented manipulation by state legislatures in this area
might seem minimal (especially if we insist that any state law of this
variety be in place before a Senator departs), a legislature could still
decide, after each gubernatorial election and depending on the party
identity of the governor and the current U.S. Senators, to enact or
repeal such a law requiring party continuity. In short, there is always
some non-trivial potential for partisan shenanigans.9
This gamesmanship possibility becomes even more problematic
when considered against the backdrop, discussed above,96 of the need
for prompt filling of Senate vacancies and the variation in state laws.
The fact that some, but not all states, might constrain governors to
pick from a single party might lead some governors upon whom
maintenance of party consistency is imposed to balk in filling a
vacancy. The Wyoming episode last year itself provides an
illustration. When Senator Thomas from that state died, there was
the possibility of another Senate vacancy arising because of the
tenuous health status of Senator Tim Johnson from neighboring
South Dakota.97 Happily, Senator Johnson, a Democrat, recovered
95. State legislatures have occasionally timed the enactment of their laws concerning
gubernatorial appointment power around the partisan affiliation of the current
officeholders. For example, Massachusetts amended its Senate vacancy statute before the
2004 general election perhaps because U.S. Democratic Senator John Kerry's seat would
have become vacant had he been elected President and the Governor, Mitt Romney, was a
Republican. See also supra notes 57-58, and accompanying text (discussing the Colorado
legislature episode).
96. See supra notes 88-92, and accompanying text.
97. See Kate Zernike, Ill Senator is Called Responsive; Incident Keeps Capital Riveted,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at Al. See also Adam Nossiter, Congressman Named to Fill
Senate Seat in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1., 2008, at A9; Vikram David Amar, The
Wyoming Governor's and the U.S. Senate's Unnoticed Options, Under the Seventeenth
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from the undiagnosed terminal illness. Had he died, Republican
South Dakota Governor Mike Rounds would have had the power to
appoint a temporary replacement. Because South Dakota statutes do
not constrain the Governor there to maintain party consistency,
Governor Rounds was expected to appoint a Republican to replace
Democrat Johnson had a vacancy occurred.98 This variation among
even neighboring states could easily cause a Democratic governor in
Wyoming to balk at appointing a Republican temporary appointee,
for fear of creating a Republican semi-incumbent to run in the special
election. A vacancy could thus have persisted if partisan pressures
had prevailed.
The costs of extended vacancies, and perhaps the tendency to
cater to partisan influences, are especially pronounced in times of
national emergency where the balance of party power in the Senate
could have monumental consequences, and lead to a shorthanded
Senate for a longer time. As Professor Levinson has argued, in the
event of catastrophic vacancies caused by, say, terrorism, filling
vacancies with somebody is of the utmost importance. Perhaps party
discontinuity is a small price to pay to have the legitimacy that comes
from increasing Senate membership when its ranks are depleted due
to catastrophe.' To the extent that governors might avoid making
temporary replacements because of the constraints imposed even by
party-continuation statutes, these statutes seem troubling.
Perhaps more important, limiting the governor to persons of one
party amounts to adding "qualifications" to the office of U.S.
Senator.1°° Term Limit U.S.A., Inc. v. Thornton 1 makes clear that
neither Congress nor states, including state legislatures, are entrusted
to add qualifications for the Senate beyond those already provided
for in Article I-age, residency, etc.
But is maintaining the party identity of a state's U.S. Senate
contingent between elections prescribing a "qualification"? Thornton
suggests so. The Court there distinguished sharply between
Amendment, for Filling the Senate Vacancy Created by Senator Thomas's Death,
FINDLAW, June 8,2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ amar/20070608.html.
98. See Zernike, supra note 97.
99. Levinson, supra note 92, at 71 (noting legitimacy and deliberation problems that
arise when the legislative denominators get too small.) In his symposium commentary,
Professor Levinson does not seem to address the problems of potential delay caused by
disuniformity and the partisan wrangling it might generate.
100. This is also, of course, a challenge (in addition to those already discussed) that
could be levied against more aggressive laws in Wyoming, Hawaii and Utah, as well.
101. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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"procedural" time, place and manner regulations over which states
have power, on the one hand, and "substantive" qualifications for
office over which they do not, on the other. Surely, prescribing party
affiliation is not a "time, place, or manner" regulation. A state
legislature, as noted above, certainly could not adopt such a limit on
the state electorate; nor could Congress impose such a limit on a
state's regular or special elections."
To be sure, the "time, place, and manner" clause by its terms
concerns only elections-not gubernatorial appointments. An
argument can be made that state legislative power over special
elections under the "as the legislature may direct" language of the
Seventeenth Amendment should track legislative power to regulate
"times, places and manners" of regular federal elections. But, again,
neither of these provisions seems to speak directly to the "process" of
gubernatorial appointments.
But, if anything, the absence of specific textual state legislative
power in the Seventeenth Amendment's appointment provisions
would indicate less leeway for state legislatures to regulate governors
than to regulate voters. Even if there is some intuitive appeal for
allowing state legislatures some leeway in structuring gubernatorial
appointment processes in ways that seem truly procedural, 3
specifying party identity would fall outside such leeway.
Another set of challenges to a state law mandating party
consistency goes to the very premise of these laws in the first place.
Does maintaining party consistency really implement the will of the
past voters? Suppose, for example, that Senate vacancies are caused
by scandals that tar one political party or group of individuals, or that
call into question the legitimacy of the (now departed) incumbent's
election itself.1" Shouldn't governors be able to take account of
102. Id. at 832-33 (states can regulate elections only in the same way Congress can
override under Article I, Section 4). Professor Levinson implies that Thornton's analysis
is "wooden" and that he does not feel constrained by it, see Levinson, supra note 13, at
720, but as relevant judicial authority in the area, it must be accorded significant weight.
103. For example, few would doubt the power of a state legislature to prescribe the
timeline for a gubernatorial appointment, even though there is no specific textual
authority for it.
104. Oregon Senator Robert Packwood's arguably illegitimate elections are called to
mind in this regard. It is also worth noting that the majority party in the Senate will not
likely expel members to take advantage of a party mismatch between the governor and
Senator(s) from that state because the 2/3 supermajority needed to expel a Senator
requires either that expulsions really be bi-partisan or that one party dominates the
legislature already and doesn't need to risk retribution down the line by abusing the
expulsion power.
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evolving attitudes by the state electorate about who is fit to serve?
Isn't that why the Seventeenth Amendment chooses them as the
people's surrogates? After all, governors (unlike members of the
legislature) are accountable statewide and ignore what the statewide
voters want at any given moment at their (and their party's) peril. 5
So, might a legislatively mandated party consistency provision largely
be a solution to a non-existent problem?
Related, if the premise behind "maintaining the voters' wishes
until the next election" is a sound one, why limit ourselves to party
affiliation? Could a state legislature require the governor to pick a
temporary replacement of the same race, sex, age, occupation, views
on abortion, etc.? And wouldn't proceeding down this slippery slope
necessarily take us into the out-of-bounds realms of impermissible
"qualifications for office?"1"
Some proponents of the Arizona law may point to the fact that
the Constitution's Framers chose a six-year Senate term in part for
reasons of stability and consistency."' But the kind of consistency and
insulation and stability that these longer (and staggered) Senate terms
bring about relates to the individual Senators and the Senate as an
institution, not to the political parties who happen to control the
Senate at a given time."
Indeed, if we really wanted to replicate the departed Senator
until the next election, wouldn't the obvious approach be to have a
Senator designate his own successor (presumably pre-departure) and
have the governor be required by law to respect that apostolic
succession?"°  But wouldn't the plain text of the Seventeenth
Amendment creating appointment power in governors, and not
105. Note also that in many places, governors are recallable for extremely unpopular
things. See G. Alan Tarr, The State of State Constitutions, 62 LA. L. REV. 3, 7 (2001)
(noting that a 1996 constitutional amendment in Minnesota brought the total number of
states allowing recall of state elected officials to eighteen); NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, RECALL OF STATE OFFICIALS, Mar. 21, 2006, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/ legismgt/elect/recallprovision.htm (providing detailed
analysis of the eighteen states allowing recall of state officials). See generally Vikram
David Amar, Adventures in Direct Democracy: The Top Ten Constitutional Lessons from
the California Recall Experience, 92 CAL. L. REV. 927 (2004).
106. Of course, race and gender (coupled with state action issues) raise their own set of
constitutional problems.
107. Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election, supra note 31, at 1351-52; Vikram David
Amar, Note, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. 1111, 1116-19 (1987-1988).
108. Amar, The Senate and the Constitution, supra note 95, at 1118-19.
109. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113,131 (1995).
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Senators themselves, combined with Thornton's teaching that our
current Constitution does not permit Congress to regulate the
qualifications for Congressional officeholding, obviously foreclose
such a scheme?
V. Although the Senate Did Not Appear to Appreciate Its
Role Last Year, Senators Themselves Have the Authority to
Interpret and Vindicate the Meaning of the Seventeenth
Amendment
The Constitution makes each house, including the Senate, the
"Judge of the... Qualifications of its own members."" ° So if the
Wyoming Governor had decided to appoint someone outside of the
three names submitted to him, it would arguably have fallen upon the
Senate to decide whether this person was "qualified" to be appointed,
such that the Senate would have had to decide what it thought the
Seventeenth Amendment did or did not mean.
Indeed if a majority of Senators believed that the constitutional
flaws I have identified in Wyoming's statute are unseverable from the
portion of the Wyoming statute that authorizes the Governor to make
temporary Senate appointments in the first place, the Senate could
have legitimately concluded that there is no valid "empower[ment]"
of the Wyoming Governor under the current scheme. The Senate
could then have rejected as unqualified (and therefore refused to
seat) anybody the Governor appointed-including people on the list
of three he will shortly get.
Under this quite plausible scenario, the vacancy from Wyoming
would have remained unfilled until either a popular election had been
held or until the Wyoming legislature passed a new gubernatorial
authorization that would be free of the impermissible restraints and
that would allow the Governor to appoint a Democrat.
And under the so-called "political question" doctrine (which,
many thought should have been invoked in Bush v. Gore11' itself),
federal courts might very well say that since the Constitution gives the
Senate power to judge its members' qualifications, federal courts
ought to stay out of all these disputes.
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
111. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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The Senate should step up to its interpretive duties;"2 alas, it
hasn't, and that is unfortunate. And if a new controversy ripens in
Arizona this presidential election year, it could be tragic.
112. Amar, The Senate and the Constitution, supra note 95, at 1122.. See generally
DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF
RESPONSIBILITY 344 (1966); Bernard W. Bell, Marbury v. Madison and the Revolution of
1800: Marbury v. Madison and the Madisonian Vision, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 206-07
(2003); Paul Brest, Congress' Role and Responsibility in the Federal Balance of Power:
Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21
GA. L. REV. 57 (1986).
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